Over the weekend, Ukraine succeeded in stemming Russia’s assault, audiences around the world rallied behind Ukraine, and transatlantic allies took their response to Russian aggression to a whole new level. level. These developments have forced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – who ahead of Friday’s NATO meeting to discuss the Russian invasion had criticized his allies as being all talk and no action – to end his own inaction. in the face of Thursday’s request from Ukraine to Ankara to close the Bosphorus. and Dardanelles, and with them access to the Black Sea, to Russian warships in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced on Sunday that what was unfolding in Ukraine was well a “war”, effectively closing the strait to the warships of the belligerents. Erdoğan on Monday gave his implicit blessing to the decision by stating how Turkey intends to continue implementing the convention in a way to prevent the escalation of the crisis, emphasizing that Turkey wants peace in the region. He expressed his disappointment that Turkey’s mediation/arbitration offers did not bear fruit and that Turkey does not wish to give up good relations with the two countries.
The decision was partly prompted by the decision of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky tweet saturday thanking Turkey for closing the strait and partly out of the need not to be left behind. Zelenskyy deliberately put Erdoğan in the spotlight to break the Turkish president’s indecisiveness. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s dilemma of choosing between Ukraine and Russia in the conflict has not been resolved. Moreover, he faces a bigger and more fundamental dilemma of whether he will persist in his anti-Westernism, including by getting closer to Russia, or take a bold strategic step and return Turkey to its traditional Western vocation. .
What Zelenskyy was looking for in Erdoğan
The Montreux Convention has regulated merchant and military maritime traffic to and from the Black Sea for 85 years. It establishes a set of provisions to regulate the passage of warships through the straits. These provisions govern the mode of entry, length of stay and tonnage, as well as the nature of the weapons (calibres of the main guns, to be precise) that they can carry on board. Their application varies according to whether a passage takes place in time of peace, in time of war or in the event of threat of war. Although the agreement generally favors the Black Sea littoral states (Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia) over others in terms of transiting warships through the strait, some restrictions apply universally regardless to a coastal-non-coastal distinction.
Zelensky’s call concerning Article 19 of the convention which obliges Turkey in time of war to close the straits to the passage of warships of belligerent states. Turkey also has the option of invoking Article 21 if Turkey considers itself to be in “imminent danger of war”. Then, “the passage of warships will be entirely at the discretion of the Turkish government”. However, in both cases, there are exceptions that would allow warships belonging to “belligerent powers” to return to their home bases from outside the Black Sea.
Turkey could have claimed that what is happening in Ukraine is not a war, especially since Moscow has not officially declared war on Ukraine. However, given the egregious nature of Russia’s aggression, revealed so transparently through social media, such a stance would have been embarrassing. lack of credibility. It would also have opened a Pandora’s box regarding the future of the Montreux Convention. The implementation of the convention has never been perfect, but the fact that so far no attempt at revision has been made and that the international community has continued to abide by its terms speaks volumes. Credit for that goes mainly to Turkey’s long-standing tradition of scrupulously monitoring the implementation of its terms. It could have changed and triggered revision requests, a long-standing Turkish nightmare. Moreover, the decision to close the strait to the warships of the belligerents should not change the military situation in the Black Sea. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, is formidable; Moscow had already completed its shipbuilding and the Ukrainian navy is very limited. The real impact of the Turkish decision will be felt if the conflict turns into a war of attrition for Russia.
Erdoğan’s Reasons for Caution and New Dilemmas
Turkey’s economy is in its worst shape for a long time, marked by soaring inflation and a growing current account deficit. Russia and Ukraine are economically dear to Turkey. 78% of Turkey’s grain imports come from both countries (64.6% from Russia and 13.4% from Ukraine). At a time when Western tourists remain on the sidelines, Russian and Ukrainian tourists have been an important source of income for a sector which represents around 4% of Turkish GDP. Both countries are important markets for Turkish exports as well as for construction services. Finally, Turkey has important defense projects with both. Indeed, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones were a valuable asset to Ukraine in the early days of the war.
However, in terms of dependency, the balance favored Russia. First, in terms of energy, Turkey is highly dependent on Russia. It is the second largest importer of Russian natural gas after Germany and Russia built a nuclear power plant that would supply 30% of Turkey’s energy needs by 2030. Second, Turkey has relied on l Russian acquiescence in northern Syria to deter the Assad regimes from launching an offensive that risks displacing large numbers of displaced Syrians into Turkey at a time when public discontent against Syrian refugees is at a fever pitch (see slide 95 here). Furthermore, there is also the legacy of the pain Russian President Vladimir Putin inflicted on Turkey after a Russian fighter jet was shot down by Turkey in November 2015 and the way Putin wrung an apology. to Erdoğan himself.
Undoubtedly, these considerations would have weighed heavily in Erdoğan’s initial inaction and his choice to buy time not to upset Putin. It may still be too early to predict the course of events in the immediate future, but it looks increasingly like Putin’s strategy has failed, and Ukrainians as a whole have held their ground long enough for most people join them. More importantly, Putin inadvertently helped transatlantic allies to unite and ultimately confront him with some really tough sanctions as well as supply significant deadly weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, the past weekend also revealed the weakness of Putin’s system of governance in the face of a country led by a democratically elected president struggling to rejoin the Western world.
Beyond the pressure the crisis is putting on energy prices, Western sanctions – in particular the decision to restrict Russian banks’ access to SWIFT – will have a negative impact on the Turkish economy. The fragile Turkish currency lost 5% of its value just on the announcement of the Russian invasion. News of a barrage of tourism cancellations destroying expectations of a post-COVID-19 boom will exacerbate this fragility.
These developments leave Erdoğan with a new dilemma: to persist with his current policies or to return Turkey to its traditional Western strategic orientation. The decision to implement Article 19 of the Montreux Convention was an important step in the right direction, but others should follow. Three suggestions: stop the relentless anti-Western rhetoric, drop the rationale for building the massive Istanbul Canal project as allowing Turkey to circumvent the Montreux convention, and drop the Russian S-400 missile systems that have so seriously harmed Turkey’s position in the transatlantic alliance and increased Turkey’s dependence on Russia.
